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Xenotransplantation, Subsistence
Hunting & the Pursuit of Health:
Lessons for Animal RightsBased Vegan Advocacy
ABSTRACT
I argue that, contrary to what Tom Regan suggests, his rights view
implies that subsistence hunting is wrong, that is, killing animals
for food is wrong even when they are the only available food source,
since doing so violates animal rights. We can see that subsistence
hunting is wrong on the rights view by seeing why animal experimentation, specifically xenotransplanation, is wrong on the rights
view: if it’s wrong to kill an animal to take organs to save a human
life, it’s wrong to kill an animal to eat that animal to save a human
life or improve human health. I discuss these arguments’ implications for animal rights-based vegan advocacy, insofar as some people
claim that they don’t feel their best on vegan diets and so their eating meat is morally justified. I argue that such an attempt to justify
consuming animal products fails on Regan’s rights view, but discuss
some attempts to morally excuse such violations of animals’ rights.
These attempts are inspired by Regan’s attempts at potentially excusing animal rights advocates’ using medications developed using
animals.
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Introduction
Communities that survive by subsistence hunting probably
rarely, if ever, encounter vegan or animal rights advocacy. But
a common question asked of vegan advocates is, “What if you
were somewhere where there was literally nothing else to eat
but animals? Would eating animals be wrong then?”
I suspect that many vegan advocates dodge the question, observing that our finding ourselves in such a situation is very
unlikely, and very unlike most of our present circumstances
where vegan foods are readily available. They might also urge
postponing the question until we found ourselves stuck, say,
at the North Pole, when it’s a “live” issue for us. They might
also respond that just as we don’t need to decide whether and
when human cannibalism is ever morally permissible to know
that it’s wrong in ordinary circumstances, we also don’t need
to answer this question to know that we should eat vegan when
we easily can. And some might respond that, no, it wouldn’t be
wrong, in those challenging circumstances to eat animals: perhaps the view would be that “all (or many) bets are off” in such
extreme circumstances: ordinary moral rules no longer apply.
I argue, however, to the contrary, that killing animals for
food, even in circumstances such as these, is wrong: subsistence hunting is wrong. At least that’s what animal rights advocates, following Tom Regan, should think. I then discuss the
impact this finding should have for vegan and animal rights
advocacy insofar as some, more than a few, people claim to not
feel their best on vegan diets and so argue that their eating meat
or other animal products is justified.
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Xenotransplantation and Animal Rights
To see why subsistence hunting – that is, roughly, the killing of animals for food when there is literally nothing else for
human beings to eat besides those animals – is wrong, we can
consider the animal rights basic perspective on animal experimentation, the using of animals in medical contexts to try
to benefit human beings. As Tom Regan reviews in his essay
“Empty Cages: Animal Rights and Vivisection”:
Experimental procedures include drowning, suffocating, starving, and burning; blinding animals and destroying their ability to hear; damaging their brains,
severing their limbs, crushing their organs; inducing
heart attacks, ulcers, paralysis, seizures; forcing them
to inhale tobacco smoke, drink alcohol, and ingest
various drugs, such as heroin and cocaine. (2012, 108)
Experimentation clearly harms animals, especially since
they are nearly always killed at the end of the experiments.
The animal rights perspective on animal experimentation is,
of course, that it is wrong because it violates animals’ rights
to their lives and bodies, at least. And it’s wrong even if done
“humanely” and with a painless death: healthy, or potentially
healthy, animals are done no favors by being killed before their
natural times. And it’s wrong even if human beings, even lots
of human beings, benefit from it. That is the animal rights position: so-called “animal welfare” positions deny some or all of
this in permitting animal experimentation if certain conditions
are met.
According to the animal rights view, for example, animal
experimentation in development known as “xenotransplanta-
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tion,” the “harvesting” or theft of organs from animals such
as pigs and primates to transplant to human beings who will
likely die without an organ transplant, is wrong (Begley, 2017).
This is because it violates the animal’s rights whose organ is
taken and so dies as a result. While it is very unfortunate when
a human person needs a new organ to survive and that organ
is not available from a human donor (and no artificial organ is
available), that does not justify violating any animal’s rights,
just as it would not justify stealing an organ from a human
patient in the next room, even if that organ theft victim will
survive the loss.
Regan provides a theoretical explanation for why such organ theft, in both human and animal cases, is wrong: doing
so treats others as mere things for one’s own personal benefit
(Regan 2004; 1983). Even if it’s a one-time operation, never to
be done again, organ theft treats someone else as a mere resource to be used for the benefit of others. Fundamentally, it’s
a disrespectful action that denies the victim’s inherent value.
There are limits to what we may do to save our own lives, even
when we are “under attack” not by any moral agent or even a
moral patient but a disease or our own bodies’ malfunctions,
and violating others’ rights is never a morally acceptable response to the attack. For example, if my child is gravely ill, I
cannot perform a fatal experiment on my neighbor’s healthy
child to even successfully save my own child’s life, especially
if the parents don’t consent, and even if they do, since this violates that child’s rights.

Subsistence Hunting
We are now able to see why subsistence hunting is wrong.
Animal experimentation of many kinds is wrong since it violates animals’ rights. And if animal experimentation of various
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kinds is wrong, for reasons like those that Regan (and others)
develops and defends, then it is also wrong to kill animals for
food even when there is nothing else to eat.
If it’s wrong to kill an animal to save your life from a likely
fatal medical problem by taking a pig’s or primate’s organ(s)
to save your life, then it is also wrong to kill an animal to save
your life from starvation. If you can’t permissibly kill a pig to
get an organ to transplant to save your life, then surely you
can’t permissibly kill the pig to get an organ to eat to save
your life. One’s “needs,” even one’s needs for what’s needed
for life itself, need not justify violating another’s rights, as Judith Thompson made clear in her famous discussion of abortion (Thompson, 1971): even if someone needs to use another’s
kidneys to stay alive, they do not have a right to the use of those
kidney’s and nobody violates their rights by not allowing them
to use their kidneys: a person’s own right to life is not a right
to others’ bodies, even if that body is needed to preserve one’s
own life.
This all seems to imply that substance hunting is wrong:
hunters do not have a right to animals’ lives and bodies, even if
those lives and bodies are needed to sustain the hunters’ lives.
So, unless communities that depend on subsistence hunting
can find something else to eat that doesn’t involve violating
rights, they will have to move to stop violating animals’ rights
in these ways. Or they would have to perish, it seems.
While this may seem harsh, it is perhaps comparable to a
country where, for whatever reason, nearly all the citizens are
in desperate need of organ transplants or else they will die. A
neighboring country could be raided and its citizens’ organs
taken, and those people killed in the process. But that would
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be profoundly wrong, as it would involve massive rights violations. So, unless another solution can be found, it appears
that the organ-needy persons would have to perish. This reminds us that respecting rights can be personally demanding
and have high personal costs, but this is a simple consequence
of the idea of rights: some actions must be done (or must not be
done) “though the heavens fall” for individuals or communities. A contrary position, that self-preservation or communitypreservation can be justified at literally any cost to others is
indefensible. And we can’t forget that, in this case, violating
rights would have high personal costs to those whose organs
are stolen and their lives taken.
In the only passage from Regan highly applicable to subsistence hunting that I can find, since he only discusses “sport”
hunting, he writes this concerning the potential permissibility
of killing animals for food:
If it were the case that these [essential] nutrients [that
meat provides] were not otherwise available [from nonanimal sources], then the case for eating meat, even
given the rights view, would be on solid ground. If we
were certain to ruin our health by being vegetarians,
or run a serious risk of doing so . . and given that the
deterioration of our health would deprive us of a greater variety of number of opportunities for satisfaction
than those within the range of farms animals, then we
would be making ourselves, not the animals, worseoff if we become vegetarians. (Regan, 2004/1983: 337,
emphasis mine).
Regan’s response to this reasoning is just to observe that the
factual claim concerning nutrition is false: we don’t need to eat
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animal products to be healthy. So, he responds that meat-eating
could be justified, if the facts were different from what they
are, but that they are not.
Regan does not, however, engage the hypothetical “What
if?” and underlying moral reasoning behind his argument that
eating meat could be permissible. This is unfortunate since
what he says seems to be, at least, inconsistent with the animal
rights perspective on xenotransplantation. Consider some comparable claims:
If we were certain to ruin our health, or lose our lives,
by not taking organs from healthy animals, or run a
serious risk of doing so . . and given that the deterioration of our health, and loss of our lives, would deprive us of a greater variety of number of opportunities
for satisfaction than those within the range of farms
animals, then we would be making ourselves, not the
animals, worse-off if we refrained from taking organs
from animals. If it were the case that these organs from
xenotransplantation were not otherwise available, say
from human donors or artificial organs, then the case
for xenotransplantation, even given the rights view,
would be on solid ground.
Rejecting such reasoning is at the core of the rights view: indeed, it distinguishes the rights view from, say, utilitarian and
other so called “welfarist” perspectives: animals rights must be
respected, even if that makes human persons worse off.
So, what Regan says about eating meat appears to be inconsistent with the rights view. I do grant that if every human
being had to eat meat to survive, as opposed to a few isolated
individuals with peculiar biological needs for meat, and that’s
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the way it always has been, that might make the case feel different: in this world, it would seem unavoidable that we routinely engage in rights violations. This recognition, however,
might prompt us to vigorously find some other food sources
that don’t involve rights violations, or we might realize that we
are making a choice to violate rights that we don’t really have
to make, and act accordingly, whatever that might be.
Rights are not absolute, however; Regan acknowledges that
they are prima facie in nature and that there can be circumstances where violating rights is justified. Indeed, his comments about the “solid ground” for killing animals for food
might be an application of a misinterpretation of his own
“worse-off principle,” which is meant to provide guidance in
cases where we must violate rights:
Special considerations aside, when we must decide
to override the rights of the many or the rights of the
few who are innocent, and when the harms faced by
the few would make them worse-off than any of the
many would be if any other option were chosen, then
we ought to override the rights of the many. (Regan
2004; 1983, 308)
This principle prioritizes those who are made worse off
by an action, whatever their numbers, when we must violate
rights: if we must either minorly violate the rights of a 1000
people or majorly violate the rights of one person, we should
minorly violate the rights of a 1000: the numbers don’t matter.
The problem though, if this principle is supposed to justify
the potential for meat-eating being justified, is this: in cases
of xenotransplantation, or substance hunting, there are alternatives that don’t involve any rights violations, namely, not steal-
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ing organs and not killing animals for food. That may, or, for
the sake of argument, will result in human deaths. And those
human beings might very well be worse off for that than any
animals would be, if they were killed. But nobody’s rights were
violated. So the worse-off principle does not apply to cases of
xenotransplantation, or any typical animal research, or subsistence hunting, contrary to Professor Regan’s remarks, since
they are not cases where any rights must be violated.

Vegan Advocacy
I have argued that subsistence hunting is wrong, if animal
experimentation is wrong, for animal rights reasons. Few readers of this essay, however, likely encounter subsistence hunters
or have much, if any, influence over them. We do, however,
encounter people who claim to just not feel good, or not feel
their best, on vegan diets, or have medical conditions that make
eating vegan and staying healthy enough very difficult or impossible. At least one successful vegan advocacy organization,
Vegan Outreach (VeganOutreach.org), very much acknowledges this concern and very much avoids a false message that
every person who eats vegan will be healthy and feel their best:
sometimes that is true, but sometimes it is not, and that fact
must be acknowledged, respected and thoughtfully engaged
(Adams, Breitman, and Messina, 2017).
Some people who claim to not feel their best on vegan diets
may be not telling the truth, or haven’t tried very hard, or would
benefit from skilled nutritional guidance. But it’s surely possible that some people have sincerely tried hard, have sought
expert guidance on how to meet their nutritional needs, and yet
still do not feel well on a vegan or vegetarian diet. It’s not only
possible that there are such persons, there probably really are
such persons: they’ve tried their best, but they still don’t feel
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well on vegan diets. In personal conversation, Regan told me
that he knew of a man who he (Regan) sincerely believed just
felt very poorly if he did not eat meat.
If subsistence hunting is wrong, and it’s wrong to kill animals to maintain one’s life (as it would be wrong to xenotransplant and take a healthy animal’s organ to save one’s life), then
it would presumably be wrong to kill animals to maintain one’s
health, in the vague sense of “feeling good.” If it’s wrong to kill
animals to stay alive, which presumably is usually more important than just feeling good, then it’s also wrong to kill animals
to feel good and healthy.
This is not to minimize or trivialize the importance of feeling good: living with chronic pain, or chronic fatigue, or any
other condition that profoundly worsens someone’s quality of
life, and perhaps entire worldview, can be very bad for that
person and those around him or her. But that doesn’t seem to
justify violating anyone’s rights to try to improve the situation,
including violating animal rights, and so it would be wrong to
kill animals for food, even if doing so is genuinely necessary
to promote or preserve one’s health and feeling well. At least
that’s what the rights view suggests, it seems.
Or does it?
Perhaps not. In Regan’s (2012) essay, “Animal Rights Advocacy and Modern Medicine: The Charge of Hypocrisy,” he
considers the charge that animal rights advocates who use prescription drugs, or other medical treatments, developed using
animals are “hypocrites” or not insofar as they demand that
animals’ rights not be violated, yet benefit from drugs, the development of which involves violating animals’ rights. Regan
acknowledges that the issue is complex, and his discussion is
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rich and full of insight and wisdom. And it is applicable to the
questions at hand.
Regan does not advocate that animal advocates simply let
themselves die to avoid supporting drug companies’ violating
animal rights. Presumably, although he does not discuss the
issues, he would also not encourage animal advocates to starve
themselves to death to avoid supporting any killing of animals
for food.
It should be made immediately clear, however, that the potential of someone dying because they refuse to eat anything
that directly involves violating animals’ rights is far more unrealistic than anyone dying from not supporting the pharmaceutical industry. This is because it seems likely biologically impossible that anyone must eat recently killed conscious, sentient,
“subject of a life” animals to stay alive and healthy. It’s hard to
believe that such a person couldn’t survive and be healthy eating bivalves or other non-conscious animals, insects, the eggs
laid by chickens who live good lives, or roadkill, or animals
who recently died of natural causes, among other options. So,
an “eat-animals-or-die” case is unlikely compared to a “useanimal-tested-medications-or-die” case, especially in contexts
where a variety of foods are available: there will nearly always
be a way to avoid death without eating what can be called
“whole” animals. Anyone who lives by subsistence hunting,
however, might not have these options though: they would have
to eat whole animals or perish unless they are willing to move
to a vegan-friendly location (or become cannibals, presumably
a morally impermissible option).
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With these qualifications in mind, let’s see if what Regan
argues about the pharmaceutical case can be extended to anyone who must eat whole animals or else perish or be unhealthy.
Regan tentatively and cautiously argues that it can be permissible for animal rights advocates to take medications developed with the use of animals. This is because the animal experimentation involved in the drug development is accidental
to the development of the drug, not essential: the animal use
did not causally contribute to the drug’s development; indeed,
given misleading results from animal research, the drug may
have been developed in spite of any results from animal research (287-8). This type of justification could be used to try to
explain why it’s not wrong to continue to use buildings made
from slave labor – the buildings were in fact made by slaves,
but they could have been made without them – and why using
items made by Nazis using the bodies of their victims is wrong
– those items could not have been made without brutal, inhumane violations of rights. So it has general plausibility, and so
perhaps justifies animal advocates taking prescription drugs,
even though animals’ rights are violated in their development.
It doesn’t seem though that this justification could plausibly
be applied to cases where someone must eat whole animals to
stay alive or healthy. One could say that it is merely accidental that the needed nutrients are found only in the body of a
subject-of-a-life animal, not essential, and so it’s not wrong to
kill these animals to eat them. This claim could be supported
by observations about the development of “clean” meat, that is,
meat developed apart from any animal’s body, to try to argue
that meat and animals are indeed separable: you can have meat
without animals. To me, however, this is an implausible stretch
of the principle since, in current actual cases, (a) the nutrients
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and the body of the animal and (b) the life of the animal are
basically inseparable. This is akin to a murderer claiming that
the experience of murdering that he or she seeks are separable
from the effects on the victim, that there is merely an accident connection between the two, and so murder is not wrong,
which is an awful and absurd attempt at a justification. A drug
and the animal experimentation that was involved in development are separable in a way that an animal and his or her consumed body or body parts are not: the latter is a constitutional
relation, not a causal or temporal relation. So it does not seem
that Regan’s justification of animal advocates using pharmaceuticals can be extended to the eating of animals, even when
necessary to preserve one’s life or health.
Recall though that Regan does not discuss this exact issue,
as far as I know. And, again, we can only suspect that he would
argue that it can be permissible for animal advocates to eat
animal products when it is genuinely necessary for them to be
healthy and feel good enough and that they are not hypocrites
for doing so. Presumably, he wouldn’t argue that anyone in
such circumstances must just die or be very ill when eating
whole animal products would prevent that.
One of the arguments that Regan discusses in favor of animal advocates using pharmaceuticals is that if they are dead
or ill then they cannot effectively advocate for animal rights
(285-7). So, to continue advocating for the respect of animal
rights, perhaps it can be permissible to partake in some practices that violate animal rights. Regan’s reservation about this
argument is that some means to promote, and even secure,
animal rights would be wrong: for example, Regan states that
torturing animal researchers’ children to end animal research
would be wrong. This argument in favor of using pharmaceu-
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ticals doesn’t seem to recognize any moral constraints in seeking animal rights: Regan concludes “what is effective might
well be morally wrong” (287) and this argument doesn’t recognize that.
In reply, perhaps the argument could be augmented with a
constraint that if and only if the supported rights violation is not
worse than the rights violation that might be prevented in the
long run by the initial supported rights violation, or is a very
similar rights violation, then supporting that rights violation
is permissible. So, for example, someone’s supporting animal
research, and the animal rights violations involved, is permissible if doing so will enable that someone to help lessen these
types of violations of animal rights. Torturing children, however, would not be permissible, even if doing so would lessen
violations of animal rights, as a worse type of rights violation.
This response, however, is subject to many concerns: it seems
to involve “using” one group to benefit another, which rights
are supposed to make wrong, and it introduces complications
concerning how to compare the relative badness of different
rights violations. So this is not a trouble-free amendment to the
argument.
But rejecting it, or something like it, is problematic also. It
is hard to believe that any animal advocates dying for the sake
of animal rights in any way helps the cause of animal rights, at
least at present. Indeed, anyone dying for animal rights is a setback, both in terms of both the attractiveness of the movement
to outsiders, potential advocates, and in terms of the numbers
and morale of current advocates. So while there surely are limits to what can be done to promote animal rights, perhaps supporting some violations of animal rights can be permissible if
and only if those rights violations are not worse than the animal
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rights violations we are seeking to end, given broader animalrights related goals.
Regan also emphasizes that the context of our decisions is
not our own creation: we are thrown into a world full of massive rights violations, animal and human, and must make the
most of it to try to lessen these rights violations and work for
the respectful treatment of all. Since the context of our decision
is not self-created, and certainly not created with a peaceable
kingdom in mind, perhaps acts of self-preservation are excusable and understandable, even if they involve some participation in rights violations, if doing so is more likely to increase
the respect for animal rights than not, in the long run.
Although it is hard to explain why, it appears then that,
perhaps,a some actions that involve violating animals’ rights,
such as human beings’ using drugs developed using animals
and eating animal products when they genuinely must do so for
good or better health (or life), might be morally permissible, or
at least excusable, if doing so will better enable the person to
advocate for animal rights and the rights violations we benefit
from are not worse than those we try to seek to lessen or eliminate. This proposal might likely apply to many more mundane
actions that invariably results in harms to animals, such as
driving and common ways of growing and harvesting crops, at
least. Arguably these literally avoidable actions violate animal
rights, and perhaps the proposal developed above helps justify
them.
Finally, although Regan does not discuss this, but perhaps
this is a situation where the “impotence of the individual”
might make a positive difference for animal advocates: in
most cases, if an animal advocate were to eat meat, or other
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animal products, it is unlikely that purchase and consumption
will cause more animals rights to be violated. If so, then eating
animal products might be a kind of “free riding” that does not
cause more rights violations but allows for some human being
to be in a better position to advocate for animals. The same
might be said about pharmaceuticals developed using drugs,
although this defense is harder to apply to xenotransplantation,
if a specific animal is killed for an organ for a specific individual: then an individual’s actions might plausibly make a causal
difference to the fate of some particular animal. This justification, however, is problematic in that it opens the door to anyone
justify their behavioral indifference to animal rights because,
they insist, their actions won’t make a positive difference for
animals. We surely want to try to resist that type of reasoning
about all sorts of social justice issues. But, on the other hand, it
does seem to simply be true that individual actions often don’t
obviously make the concrete differences we hope they would:
that truth should likely not be denied and perhaps it sometimes
makes a difference to, at least, how confident we should be
about the morality of our actions.
Although it is hard to explain why, it appears then that some
actions that involve violating animals’ rights, such as using
drugs developed using animals and humans eating animal
products when they genuinely must do so for good or better
health (or life), might be morally permissible, even though they
involve violating animals’ rights, if doing so will better enable
the person to advocate for animal rights.
Whether these rights violations could be justified only if
they better enable to someone to advocate for animals is an
interesting question: if “yes,” that answer might, surprisingly,
result in it being permissible for animal advocates to occasion-
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ally support violating animals’ rights, but wrong for foes of
animals to do the same action: that is an interesting result, and
surely one that it would be hard to use to develop policy, as well
as a bit paradoxical: animal advocates can sometimes support
animal rights violations, since they will go on to promote animal rights, but those indifferent to animal rights, and oppose
it, cannot? Promoting such a view to the public would surely
not work, so perhaps everyone should be viewed as a potential
animal advocate and treated accordingly as if they were an actual advocate (a problematic proposal in itself, insofar as rarely
should potential things of a kind be treated as actual things of
that kind).

Conclusion
In conclusion, vegan advocates are often asked “What if you
were somewhere where there was literally nothing else to eat
but animals? Would eating animals be wrong then?” The basic
options for response are to either dodge the question, answer
“yes,” or answer “no.” I have argued that the “no” answer, that
it would be permissible to eat animals in these circumstances
is contrary to animal rights perspectives: in particular, that reasoning would justify xenotransplantation. I have argued that
the “yes” answer, however, faces challenges but that there may
be complicated, but plausible, ways to at least morally excuse
people supporting some violations of animals’ rights, especially if their doing so better enables them to advocate for animals.
Perhaps the best and wisest response, for most people, in most
contexts, is to dodge the question, as perhaps Professor Regan
did, so that none of us get distracted from the core, immediate,
and pressing questions and challenges about animal rights that
confront each of us as we are and where we are, now.
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Notes
For helpful comments, I am grateful to Robert Bass, Rick
Bogle, Bob Fischer, Rupert McCallum and Josh Milburn and
two anonymous reviewers for this journal.
After developing the main arguments for this paper, I read
Jason Hanna’s excellent paper, “A Moral License to Kill?
Animal Rights and Hunting,” in Mylan Engel and Gary Comstock, eds., The Moral Rights of Animals (Lexington Books,
2016). He also argues that the animal rights explanation for the
wrongness of animal experimentation suggests the wrongness
of subsistence hunting. Hanna’s paper offers some arguments
that are similar to mine, but for generally overall different purposes, and readers are very much encouraged to read his very
insightful paper.
I also observe that Mark Rowlands in Animals Like Us argues that subsistence hunting is permissible, since it satisfies
“vital” human interest (161), but that animal experimentation
never is, even though it could occasionally satisfy a “vital” human interest (144-50). His arguments are subject to the critique
above.
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